Will Obamacare help the country economy?

You are crazy.... are You trying to tell me if a family of three, making $90,000 a year refuse to get insurance they go scott free with no tax requirements?
You don't know anymore than what the progressive media tells You.
Think before You answer, because if that was true why would anyone buy insurance?
Here’s how it works. If your income is below the federal poverty line, or you don’t file a tax return, you’re exempt from the mandate’s $695 fine. If we assume that the federal poverty level is about $27,000 for a family of four in 2016, everyone below that level is exempt.
Between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level—under our estimates, that’s between $27,000 and $108,000 for a family of four—Americans will be eligible for the new exchanges. As the below chart illustrates, these subsidies are initially scaled such that no one within this bracket will pay more than 9.5 percent of income for health premiums; the rest will be paid for by taxpayers. Subsidized individuals are subject to the mandate.
For those making more than 400 percent of FPL—approximately $108,000 for a family of four—the subsidies end. But you’re also exempted from the mandate if the cheapest plan in the exchange costs more than 8 percent of your income. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cheapest bronze plan in 2016 will cost between $12,000 and $12,500 per family. If we take the midpoint of that estimate, and divide by 8 percent, we get $153,125. That is to say, if your income is between 400 percent of FPL ($108,000) and $153,000 or so, and you’re in a family of four, you’re exempt from the mandate.
Because Obamacare forces insurers to take you even if you are already sick, the law incentivizes many people to go without insurance until they actually fall ill. If the average family plan for four costs $12,250, and a family of four would pay a maximum penalty of $2,085 for failing to purchase insurance (the size of the penalty is capped at that amount), families in the right-most gray area have an incentive to go without insurance and pay the fine. These incentives are even more powerful for unmarried individuals, who tend to be younger and healthier.

Take the average individual, making $32,000 a year in 2016. (I’m optimistically assuming that wages and the federal poverty level grow by 4 percent a year.) For an individual with no dependents, the individual mandate penalty would be $695. Income of $32,000 would amount to about 237 percent of FPL.
This individual would be expected to spend approximately 7.6 percent of income on insurance, or approximately $2,430, or pay the fine. (The remaining premium costs would be subsidized by the government.) Those who are sick will take the insurance; those who are healthy are more likely to take the fine, leading us back to…adverse selection.
And this problem will get worse over time. The growth of the mandate penalty is indexed to a cost-of-living adjustment, which means its bite will decrease over time. However, after 2018, exchange subsidies are slated to grow a meaningfully higher rate—GDP plus 0.504 percent—a rate that may not keep pace with premium inflation, exposing more and more low-income Americans to rising insurance costs.

What does all this mean? It means that the cost of insurance will go up at a pace that significantly exceeds growth in the fine for not having insurance. As a result, adverse selection will increase, leading to a vicious cycle of higher premiums and even more adverse selection.