To all of YOU who posted the following image to me over the years here when I posted on this topic - & to all of you who laughed, scoffed, name called - DENIED -
And FYI - I'm still not done beating this smelly old horse - because eventually it's rotting flesh will peel off and out will come the truth about obama.
AND THE BEAT GOES ON























He made sure he did not submit it through any official channels.
Try again?
Why on earth would you suggest I am one of you?
No basis under american jurisprudence? No? Only four SCOTUS cases.
http://www.fourwinds10.net/si...
"The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253 253 (1814)
In the Venus Case, Justice Livingston, who wrote the unanimous decision, quoted the entire §212nd paragraph from the French edition, using his own English, on p. 12 of the ruling:
Vattel, ... is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says:
“The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens."
The others were;
Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 3 Pet. 242 242 (1830)
Minor v. Happersett , 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
"CONCLUSION
Finally it should be noted, that to define a term is to indicate the category or class of things which it signifies. In this sense, the Supreme Court of the United States has never applied the term 'natural born citizen' to any other category than 'those born in the country of parents who are citizens th...
No basis under american jurisprudence? No? Only four SCOTUS cases.
http://www.fourwinds10.net/si...
"The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253 253 (1814)
In the Venus Case, Justice Livingston, who wrote the unanimous decision, quoted the entire §212nd paragraph from the French edition, using his own English, on p. 12 of the ruling:
Vattel, ... is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says:
“The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens."
The others were;
Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 3 Pet. 242 242 (1830)
Minor v. Happersett , 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
"CONCLUSION
Finally it should be noted, that to define a term is to indicate the category or class of things which it signifies. In this sense, the Supreme Court of the United States has never applied the term 'natural born citizen' to any other category than 'those born in the country of parents who are citizens thereof'.
Hence every U.S. Citizen must accept this definition or categorical designation, and fulfil his constitutional duties accordingly. No member of Congress, no judge of the Federal Judiciary, no elected or appointed official in Federal or State government has the right to use any other definition; and if he does, he is acting unlawfully, because unconstitutionally."
Clearly Obama does not meet this definition of a natural born citizen since his father was not a citizen of the United States. Based on American jurisprudence.
Lets look at the Venus, and ignore that the case is addressing shipping between the US and hostile nations..
"It is therefore of some importance to inquire how far the writers on that law consider THE SUBJECT OF ONE POWER RESIDING IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER, as retaining their original character or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside.
Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The NATIVES OR INDIGENS ARE THOSE BORN IN THE COUNTRY OF PARENTS WHO ARE CITIZENS. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights."
The Venus does not use the term “natural born citizen” and refers to Vattel to establish the concept of ‘Domicile’. In fact Vattel accepts that when a father establishes permanent domicile in a foreign countr...
Lets look at the Venus, and ignore that the case is addressing shipping between the US and hostile nations..
"It is therefore of some importance to inquire how far the writers on that law consider THE SUBJECT OF ONE POWER RESIDING IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER, as retaining their original character or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside.
Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The NATIVES OR INDIGENS ARE THOSE BORN IN THE COUNTRY OF PARENTS WHO ARE CITIZENS. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights."
The Venus does not use the term “natural born citizen” and refers to Vattel to establish the concept of ‘Domicile’. In fact Vattel accepts that when a father establishes permanent domicile in a foreign country, any children born will follow the status of said parent and may become citizens of this new country. Vattel also accepts that municipal law may determine who is and who is not a citizen of any particular country. Further Vattel is defining the natives not citizens.
Shanks had to do with women's property rights, not citizenship. As Justice Grey noted in Wong Kim Ark:
Justice Grey observed in Wong Kim Ark:
"In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, decided (as appears by the records of this court) on the same day as the last case, it was held that a woman born in South Carolina before the Declaration of Independence, married to an English officer in Charleston during its occupation by the British forces in the Revolutionary War, and accompanying her husband on his return to England, and there remaining until her death, was a British subject within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, so that her title to land in South Carolina, by descent cast before that treaty, was protected thereby. It was of such a case that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
“The incapacities of femes covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.”
3 Pet. 28 U. S. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for the United States as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story CERTAINLY DID NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST TAT, INDEPENDENTLY OF TREATY, THERE WAS A ANY PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH COULD DEFEAT THE OPERATION OF THE ESTABLISHED RULE OF CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTH WITHIN THE UNITED STATES;for he referred (p. 28 U. S. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 28 U. S. 162) that “each government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens,” and, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, “there are certain principles which have been generally recognized by tribunals administering public law” [adding, in later editions "or the law of nations"] “as of unquestionable authority,” and stated, as the first of those principles, “Persons who are born in a country are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country.” Story, Conflict of Laws, § 48.
Moving on to the dicta from Minor V Happersett. The Court said "The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. SOME AUTHORITIES GO FURTHER AND INCLUDE CITIZENS BORN WITHIN THE JURIDICTION WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE CITIZENSHIP OF THEIR PARENTS. AS TO THIS CLASS THERE HAVE BEEN DOUBTS, BUT NEVER AS TO THE FIRST. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SOLVE THESE DOUBTS."
In other words this is dicta, not precedence.
Finally Wong Kim Ark stands for the exact opposite principle than you must have two citizen parents.
The Wong Kim Ark Court explained:
The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to
English nationality was birth within the allegiance-also called „ligealty,‟
„obedience,‟ „faith,‟ or „power‟-of the king. The principle embraced all
persons born within the king‟s allegiance, and subject to his protection.
Such allegiance and protection were mutual,-as expressed in the maxim,
„Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem,‟-and were not
restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who
had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so
long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such
aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within
the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born
during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king‟s dominions,
were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the
obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the
jurisdiction, of the king.
This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or explanations
of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case known as
„Calvin‟s Case,‟ or the „Case of the Postnati,‟ decided in 1608, after a
hearing in the exchequer chamber before the lord chancellor and all the
judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere.
Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; Ellesmere, Postnati, 62-64; s. c. 2
How. St. Tr. 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679.
The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co. Litt. 8a,
128b; Lord Hale, in Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P. C. 61, 62; 1
Bl. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 Bl. Comm. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe
v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-
177, 741.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn . . . said: „By the common law of
England, every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter
whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the
parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was
an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who
were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with
them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any
part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to
descent as a source of nationality.‟ Cockb. Nat. 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of
England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states
the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics:
“British subject’ means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the
crown. „Permanent‟ allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a
British subject from the allegiance of an alien, who, because he is within
the British dominions, owes „temporary‟ allegiance to the crown. „Naturalborn British subject’ means a British subject who has become a British
subject at the moment of his birth.’ ‘Subject to the exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born
within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule
contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British
nationality.‟ The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only
these two: „(1) Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in
a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such person‟s birth is
in hostile occupation, is an alien.‟ „(2) Any person whose father (being an
alien) is at the time of such person's birth an ambassador or other
diplomatic agent accredited to the crown by the sovereign of a foreign state
is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.‟ And he adds: „The
exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British
dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact
that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended
on the place of a person's birth, it in theory at least depended, not upon the
locality of a man‟s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and
allegiance of the king of England; and it might occasionally happen that a
person was born within the dominions without being born within the
allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of the
crown.‟ Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three
centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the
crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or
loyalty, the protection, the power, and the jurisdiction of the English
sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a
natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic
agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the
place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this
continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the
United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as
originally established.
13
Let's take a look at few more glowing examples of Birther failure to comprehend american law,
The Indiana Court of Appeals in Ankeny v. Governor of Indiana said:
"Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents."
Oral Arguments in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS http://www.oyez.org/cases/200...
"Justice Scalia: … I mean, isn’t it clear that the natural born requirement in the Constitution was intended explicitly to exclude some Englishmen who had come here and spent some time here and then went back and raised their families in England? They did not want that. They wanted natural born Americans.
[Ms.]. Davis: Yes, by the same token…
Justice Scalia: That is jus soli, isn’t it?"
Justice Scalia: Well, maybe. I’m just referring to the meaning of natural born within the Constitution. I don’t think you’re disagreeing. It requires jus soli, doesn’t it?"