Educate Yourself on EMP Attack.....The NEXT Battlefield

There is little doubt that efforts by the United States to harden
infrastructure against EMP — and its ability to manage critical
infrastructure manually in the event of an EMP attack — have been eroded
in recent decades as the Cold War ended and the threat of nuclear
conflict with Russia lessened. This is also true of the U.S. military,
which has spent little time contemplating such scenarios in the years
since the fall of the Soviet Union. The cost of remedying the situation,
especially retrofitting older systems rather than simply regulating
that new systems be better hardened, is immense. And as with any issue
involving massive amounts of money, the debate over guarding against EMP
has become quite politicized in recent years.

We have long avoided writing on this topic for precisely that reason.
However, as the debate over the EMP threat has continued, a great deal
of discussion about the threat has appeared in the media. Many STRATFOR
readers have asked for our take on the threat, and we thought it might
be helpful to dispassionately discuss the tactical elements involved in
such an attack and the various actors that could conduct one. The
following is our assessment of the likelihood of an EMP attack against
the United States.

Defining Electromagnetic Pulse

EMP can be generated from natural sources such as lightning or solar
storms interacting with the earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic
field. It can also be artificially created using a nuclear weapon or a
variety of non-nuclear devices. It has long been proven that EMP can
disable electronics. Its ability to do so has been demonstrated by solar
storms, lightning strikes and atmospheric nuclear explosions before the
ban on such tests. The effect has also been recreated by EMP simulators
designed to reproduce the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear device and
study how the phenomenon impacts various kinds of electrical and
electronic devices such as power grids, telecommunications and computer
systems, both civilian and military.

The effects of an EMP — both tactical and strategic — have the
potential to be quite significant, but they are also quite uncertain.
Such widespread effects can be created during a high-altitude nuclear
detonation (generally above 30 kilometers, or about 18 miles). This
widespread EMP effect is referred to as high-altitude EMP or HEMP. Test
data from actual high-altitude nuclear explosions is extremely limited.
Only the United States and the Soviet Union conducted atmospheric
nuclear tests above 20 kilometers and, combined, they carried out fewer
than 20 actual tests.

As late as 1962 — a year before the Partial Test Ban Treaty went into
effect, prohibiting its signatories from conducting aboveground test
detonations and ending atmospheric tests — scientists were surprised by
the HEMP effect. During a July 1962 atmospheric nuclear test called
“Starfish Prime,” which took place 400 kilometers above Johnston Island
in the Pacific, electrical and electronic systems were damaged in
Hawaii, some 1,400 kilometers away. The Starfish Prime test was not
designed to study HEMP, and the effect on Hawaii, which was so far from
ground zero, startled U.S. scientists.

High-altitude nuclear testing effectively ended before the parameters
and effects of HEMP were well understood. The limited body of knowledge
that was gained from these tests remains a highly classified matter in
both the United States and Russia. Consequently, it is difficult to
speak intelligently about EMP or publicly debate the precise nature of
its effects in the open-source arena.

The importance of the EMP threat should not be understated. There is
no doubt that the impact of a HEMP attack would be significant. But any
actor plotting such an attack would be dealing with immense
uncertainties — not only about the ideal altitude at which to detonate
the device based on its design and yield in order to maximize its effect
but also about the nature of those effects and just how devastating
they could be.

Non-nuclear devices that create an EMP-like effect, such as
high-power microwave (HPM) devices, have been developed by several
countries, including the United States. The most capable of these
devices are thought to have significant tactical utility and more
powerful variants may be able to achieve effects more than a kilometer
away. But at the present time, such weapons do not appear to be able to
create an EMP effect large enough to affect a city, much less an entire
country. Because of this, we will confine our discussion of the EMP
threat to HEMP caused by a nuclear detonation, which also happens to be
the most prevalent scenario appearing in the media.



Attack Scenarios

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and
certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as
discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the
megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers
somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise
at a third of this altitude. Only the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an
attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed
that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this
altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers
from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the
Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.)

The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s,
when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew
to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the
necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States
and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create
HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both
post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some
attack scenarios against the United States.

However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear
weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons
have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some
theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and
therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response,
such an attack against the United States would inherently and
necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea
that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United
States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear
deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would
have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but
that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating.

Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is
not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is
the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused
investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons
also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of
immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an
initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable
deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear
first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose
as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires
are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including
opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington
will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow
less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an
American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on.

In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP
attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a
full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they
did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

Rogue Actors



One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat
emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia or China but
from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not
possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to accomplish its mission without
leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist
group loads a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship
or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order
to get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike.
This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to
achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not
intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over
the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key
coastline or continental strike.

When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it
faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon employed in a
terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or
Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear weapons program. It is also
highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and
treasure to develop a nuclear weapon would entrust such a weapon to an
outside organization. Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously
investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified
and would pay a heavy price for such an attack (there has been a large
investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted
above, a nuclear weapon is seen as a deterrent by countries such as
North Korea or Iran, which seek such weapons to protect themselves from
invasion, not to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would
likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that other
groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of
operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a counterstrike and would
therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to
it.

Also, such a scenario would require not a crude nuclear device but a
sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic
missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude
nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead. The engineering
expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that
required to construct a crude device. A warhead must be far more compact
than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and
electronics and physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an
ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the heat and
force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed.
Designing a functional warhead takes considerable advances in several
fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering,
metallurgy and explosives technology, and overseeing it all must be a
high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our
estimation that it would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to
conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be
using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any
non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or
sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely.

But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a
functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating
the warhead to a missile it was not designed for and then getting it to
launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would
appear at first glance. Additionally, the process of fueling a
liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship
using an improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North
Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology, which uses
volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)

Such a scenario is challenging enough, even before the uncertainty of
achieving the desired HEMP effect is taken into account. This is just
the kind of complexity and uncertainty that well-trained terrorist
operatives seek to avoid in an operation. Besides, a ground-level
nuclear detonation in a city such as New York or Washington would be
more likely to cause the type of terror, death and physical destruction
that is sought in a terrorist attack than could be achieved by generally
non-lethal EMP.

Make no mistake: EMP is real. Modern civilization depends heavily on
electronics and the electrical grid for a wide range of vital functions,
and this is truer in the United States than in most other countries.
Because of this, a HEMP attack or a substantial geomagnetic storm could
have a dramatic impact on modern life in the affected area. However, as
we’ve discussed, the EMP threat has been around for more than half a
century and there are a number of technical and practical variables that
make a HEMP attack using a nuclear warhead highly unlikely.

When considering the EMP threat, it is important to recognize that it
exists amid a myriad other threats, including related threats such as
nuclear warfare and targeted, small-scale HPM attacks. They also include
threats posed by conventional warfare and conventional weapons such as
man-portable air-defense systems, terrorism, cyberwarfare attacks
against critical infrastructure, chemical and biological attacks — even
natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tsunamis.

The world is a dangerous place, full of potential threats. Some
things are more likely to occur than others, and there is only a limited
amount of funding to monitor, harden against, and try to prevent,
prepare for and manage them all. When one attempts to defend against
everything, the practical result is that one defends against nothing.
Clear-sighted, well-grounded and rational prioritization of threats is
essential to the effective defense of the homeland.

Hardening national infrastructure against EMP and HPM is undoubtedly
important, and there are very real weaknesses and critical
vulnerabilities in America’s critical infrastructure — not to mention
civil society. But each dollar spent on these efforts must be balanced
against a dollar not spent on, for example, port security, which we
believe is a far more likely and far more consequential vector for
nuclear attack by a rogue state or non-state actor.

Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack is republished with permission of STRATFOR.